Reprinted:
World Gold Council Report
Quarterly statistics commentary Q3 2012
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Overview
This commentary summarises gold's price performance in various
currencies, its volatility statistics and correlation to other assets,
and the macroeconomic factors that influenced gold's behaviour during
the quarter. In this issue, we explore the influences that
unconventional monetary policy has on financial markets. In particular
we discuss the effect of central bank policy actions on gold.
Q3 in summary
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Gold (US$/oz) returned 11.1% in the third quarter as investors
responded to further central bank measures aimed at stimulating the
economy. Volatility decreased during the period, with gold prices
experiencing little movement in the first half of the quarter;
correlations to other assets, generally low, remained similar to those
seen in Q2.
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Central banks announced a continuation of their unconventional monetary policy1 programmes in Q3.
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Central banks have numerous rationales for undertaking unconventional
monetary policy, including lowering borrowing costs and supporting
financial markets.
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Financial assets have responded to central bank policy announcements, but gold's reaction has been the strongest.
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There is a consensus that these policies drive investment into gold
purely due to inflation-risk impact. We believe that there is not one
but four principal factors that provide further support to the
investment case for gold:
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Inflation risk
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Medium-term tail-risk from imbalances
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Currency debasement and uncertainty
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Low real rates and emerging market real rate differentials
Summary of gold price performance in Q3 2012
Table 1: Performance of gold with respect to various currencies - click to enlarge
Chart 1: Gold (US$/oz) performance and key events during Q3 2012
Table 2: Timeline of central bank action in Q3 - click to enlarge
Third quarter review
By the end of September, gold (US$/oz) was up 16% year-to-date with two
thirds of the gains generated in Q3. This performance was echoed in
most currencies with returns ranging from 5.0% to 11.1%, using
end-of-period gold price data, and 0.7% to 5.2% using average prices.
The difference between these two measures reflects gold’s sharp price
rise towards the end of the quarter.
Exchange rate shifts had a notable impact on some key regional gold
prices. During the first half of the year
Indian rupee depreciation
caused the local gold price to breach a key psychological threshold,
generating the strongest return of the 19 different currency-denominated
gold prices monitored by the World Gold Council. That currency weakness
reversed in the third quarter, leading to a modest return of 5% for
gold in rupee terms. Consequently, the year-to-date performance of the
rupee gold price ranked only 11th (+15.7%) as of the end of Q3.
As Chart 1 illustrates, gold’s strong performance began in earnest only
in the latter half of August. The first few weeks of the quarter had
been quiet for gold as well as other assets. For equities and bonds, the
likely cause was a combination of northern hemisphere vacation doldrums
and low conviction amidst a slowing global economy and uncertainty
about the fate of the euro area.
For gold, as for many other assets, central bank policy announcements
and actions in late August and early September created a catalyst for
price activity. It is critical to note that while gold prices react to
monetary policy developments, they are more generally determined by a
geographically and thematically broad set of factors. A number of
positive gold-specific developments also took place in Q3, including the
IMF’s reporting of central bank purchases of gold by Russia, Turkey,
Ukraine and the Kyrgyz republic. Just before the start of the third
quarter, Turkey announced that it had raised to 30% the proportion of
gold held by commercial banks as capital requirements. This requirement
will likely boost demand as Turkish commercial banks use gold as part of
their capital portfolios.
Price volatility during the period was subdued, ranging from 11.4% for
rupee investors to 16.4% for yen investors. Gold’s lower than average
volatility was echoed in other markets: global equities, bonds and
commodities all posted numbers below their long-term averages.
2
Correlation statistics between gold and other assets were similar to
those experienced in Q2 2012 (see Chart 2). Its correlation to developed
and emerging market equities was slightly higher than normal, but its
correlation to global bonds and commodities was lower than in Q2.
However, these deviations from long-term averages were not large enough
to imply atypical behaviour. In prior quarterly commentaries we have
shown how gold’s correlation to equities hovers around zero over the
long run, but can fluctuate over shorter periods of time.
In particular, both gold and equity prices moved higher during Q3,
leading to an elevated correlation. However, prices were driven higher
by different underlying reactions. While both responded to monetary
policy announcements and measures undertaken by
central banks around the
world, equities responded to central banks’ pledges to stimulate
economic growth; gold, on the other hand, moved higher encouraged by
factors that we discuss in the section titled “unconventional monetary
policy and gold”.
Chart 2: Gold's correlation to global assets - click to enlarge
Unconventional monetary policy
Events leading up to Q3 announcements
The key developments in Q3 were undoubtedly the series of declarations
by central banks to expand their unconventional monetary policy
programmes (UMP). Weak global macroeconomic data during the preceding
quarters had created expectations among investors of further stimulus
from major central banks. However, policy meetings were not scheduled
until the latter half of Q3; thus, positioning for outcomes was kept on
hold in anticipation of announcements. In addition, a concomitant
slowdown in both India and China had also raised hopes that the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) and People’s Bank of China (PBoC) would act,
fiscally or monetarily, to support their economies. Similar sentiment
had been expressed in Brazil and South Korea.
As the quarter progressed, the case for further easing was emboldened
by the weak incoming macroeconomic data. Global manufacturing indicators
fell to a 36-month low in July – with noticeable slowdowns in the US
and Europe.
3 China’s industrial production growth reached the
lowest level since May 2009, with GDP following suit to reach 7.6% YoY.
The euro area contraction continued with 6 of 17 member countries in
recession.
4 Japan’s trade deficit quintupled to US$32bn, as a worsening export outlook compounded internal weakness.
5
The news flow, though by now largely expected and supportive of further
easing, helped drive asset prices higher across the board.
By the final week of August, the Federal Reserve (Fed) provided the
first hints that it would consider an extension of its QE programme,
despite some signs of housing and retail sector buoyancy. In addition,
the European Central Bank (ECB) announced plans for its new bond buying
programme on the premise of an ‘irreversible’ euro plagued by severe
dislocations in the region’s government bond markets. By September,
central-bank commitment to further stimulus had been announced in the
US, Europe and Japan. China had launched a new infrastructure-spending
programme to the tune of US$158bn, and India had vowed to lower its
barriers to foreign investment.
The Fed extended its quantitative easing programme to an open-ended run
rate of US$40bn per month. The ECB announced a new bond buying
programme named “outright monetary transactions” (OMT), and the Bank of
Japan (BoJ) announced a boost to its asset purchase programme,
surprising markets by doubling the size of earlier extensions.
By the end of the quarter, gold was 11.1% higher, global equities
finished up 6.2%, commodities were up 11.5% – the best performance since
the first quarter of 2011 – and global bonds saw yields fall further
and prices edge up 3.3%. Weakening economic data had finally spurred a
concerted reaction by central banks, leading to a sharp rally in asset
prices as the long wait for further easing came to an end.
Rationale and effect of unconventional monetary policy
Universally, the motivation for UMP is the need to remedy anaemic
economic activity in the face of fiscal restraint and already exhausted
conventional monetary policy. Central bankers hope a policy of asset
purchases will, in the short to medium term, lower borrowing costs and
increase perceived wealth through rising asset prices. The weakening of a
domestic currency would also be a welcome spur for the export sector.
Using these motivations, central banks have undertaken unprecedented
monetary policies since 2008 (Chart 3).
Chart 3: Central bank balance sheets have collectively expanded - click to enlarge
Despite the difficult environment for central banks, they have arguably
achieved some successes in financial markets: as the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) asserts, “unconventional monetary policy
likely helped prevent further catastrophe after the global financial
crisis and helped secure liquidity in Europe during the peak of its
crisis.”
6 These actions have, in aggregate, supported credit
as well as equity markets (Chart 4). They have bought time for banks and
governments to address solvency issues, lowered debt-servicing costs,
and boosted asset prices and corresponding sentiment based on perceived
wealth creation. However, few of these positive effects are directly
linked to underlying growth.
Chart 4: Asset returns resulting from central bank actions- click to enlarge
“Monetary policy is not panacea,” Fed Chairman Bernanke said during a
Q&A session in June. There are a number of potentially negative
consequences, including the returns for savers and shortfalls for
pension and insurance funds, food price inflation, and ‘moral hazard’ in
financial markets. These and other consequences are well documented.
7
While the highlighted longer-term reaction of assets has largely
followed expectations, as shown in Chart 4, there have been a few
exceptions. Equities in Europe and Japan have fallen since the advent of
UMP. In addition, strong initial responses to announcements of monetary
policy – both initiations and extensions of programmes – have tended to
fade. The FTSE 100 has gained a mere 2% since November 2008, despite
positive jumps following announcements. Finally, the yen has
disappointingly kept rising despite aggressive easing by the Bank of
Japan, further hurting the critical export sector.
We may not know for some time if these untested central bank policies
will work for the real economy. In fact, Bernanke, in his most recent
speech at the Fed conference in Jackson Hole, said “In summary, both the
benefits and costs of non-traditional monetary policies are uncertain;
in all likelihood they will also vary over time depending on factors
such as the state of the economy and financial markets, and the extent
of prior Federal Reserve asset purchases.” Recent academic research
supports this uncertainty of success and the fleeting impact of current
measures.
8
Unconventional monetary policy and gold
A common perception is that UMP has a singular effect that is reflected
in gold price reactions – the rise in inflation risks. However, a
closer look shows that unconventional policy affects gold through four
principal channels. While these effects will to some extent be present
in conventional policy easing, they are exaggerated by unconventional
policy.
First, Inflation risk is understandably the strongest rationale for gold’s reaction to unconventional policy.
There is a well-established relationship between the amount of money in
an economy and the rate of inflation – whereby too much money chasing
too few goods causes price appreciation. However, this is not a
straightforward relationship, and inflation can be contained if economic
growth keeps pace with money supply growth.
Current unconventional policy has increased the monetary base in most
countries without increasing the money supply (Chart 5). This is largely
due to a tightening of commercial bank lending.
9 The
distinction is important: a simple metaphor might be a cheque that is
yet to be cashed. While recent evidence shows that central bank balance
sheet expansion has not fed through to an increase in money supply
growth, money supplies are likely to increase over the long-term when
the liquidity in the system translates to private sector spending.
The increase in money supply could be a potential catalyst for higher
inflation in the future – a likely positive for gold investment.
Previous research by the World Gold Council shows that a 1% change in
money supply, six months prior, in the US, Europe, India and Turkey
tends to increase the price of gold by 0.9%, 0.5%, 0.7% and 0.05%,
respectively.
This crisis has forced central banks to aggressively fight against the
risk of deflation. While a deflationary spiral is the greatest tail risk
for many of these central banks – even low levels of inflation and
dis-inflation could be troubling given high public debt levels in most
advanced economies. In this context many market participants speculate
that central banks have actually increased their tolerance for
inflation, exceeding target levels for brief periods of time to
accelerate the deleveraging process. To this end, some point to Bernanke
vowing to not withdraw stimulus “[prematurely]”, suggesting an
acceptance of higher inflation down the road. Similarly, the Bundesbank
head, Jens Ulbrich, announced in May that a slightly higher inflation
target could be accommodated.
10 While the inflation needle
has yet to move, there appears to be a willingness to tolerate a higher
rate of inflation in future to ensure the sustainability of fragile
economic growth.
Chart 5: Money supply growth has not kept up with central bank asset purchases - click to enlarge
In summary, while inflation is to many investors a primary concern, it
is still some way off. The near term threat of deflation remains real,
and as long as central banks are willing to resort to unconventional
measures, this will imply that the deflationary threat has not
disappeared.
Research by Oxford Economics shows that both inflationary and
deflationary environments could be conducive to gold investing. While
gold’s performance during periods of high inflation is well understood,
the deflationary environment is less understood. Using its global
macro-economic model, Oxford Economics found that despite currency
related headwinds, a deflationary environment would prove destructive to
risk assets such as equities and housing, with gold outperforming.
Second, closely linked to the inflation effect is the impact that unconventional policy has on currencies.
Although seldom explicitly stated, a weaker currency is a desirable
outcome for most economies in the current environment. As global trade
slows, a weaker currency becomes all the more important to maintain
export competitiveness. While the term ‘competitive devaluation’ may be a
little dramatic, the problems of currency strength are evident.
If a desired indirect effect of expansionary monetary policy is a
weaker currency to promote export-led growth, then at least on that
front, central banks like the BoJ and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) have
not succeeded. Both the BoJ and SNB have had to resort to several
episodes of intervention to prevent their currencies from rising too
quickly. Elsewhere, countries have voiced their concerns over the
ramifications of UMP. Sweden’s Riksbank will be monitoring the exchange
rate closely after posting an “unexpectedly” rapid appreciation in Q3.
11
The Norwegian sovereign wealth fund has been selling the krone to
counter investment flows, and the central bank has not ruled out
currency intervention to maintain its inflation target.
12
Most recently, Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, expressed anger
at the Fed over QE3, which he termed a “protectionist” move.
13
Given that gold is typically transacted using its US-dollar price as
reference, it naturally provides a hedge against an investor’s concern
over domestic currency debasement; this is especially true for US
dollar-based investors who typically see a negative correlation between
the US dollar and gold.
Third, the willingness of central banks to engage in protective
strategies provides an implicit ‘put’ option – an implied guarantee to
prevent precipitous falls in asset prices. This, however,
raises the risk of undermining the efficient flow of capital, which
could foster new and dangerous imbalances in the global economy. By
vowing to intervene to prevent slides, some of the tail risk has
undoubtedly been removed in the short term. However, by extension, the
distortion created by intervention can have a longer term impact on tail
risks by incentivising credit buildups and the inefficient allocation
of capital to firms and households at an artificially low interest rate.
14
With increased tail risk looming in the longer term, investors need to
take these rallies in financial markets with caution. As investor
sentiment on the efficacy of central bank policy changes, equity markets
might give away some of the central bank-led gains. During times of
crisis and sharp market pullbacks, gold has proven to be an effective
diversifier. Research shows that gold could play a role as a tail risk
hedge by protecting investors against falls in equity and credit
markets.
Fourth, an environment of unprecedented low interest rates – negative in real terms – can greatly impact savers and investors.
In our Q2 commentary, we discussed the skewed risk/reward scenarios
that investors face in such low-rate environments. One motivation for
unconventional policy, to further depress interest rates, stems from the
belief that households will increase their expenditures. However,
prudent households will have to save greater sums of money to pay future
obligations in a low interest rate environment. The almost universally
negative real savings rates in developed countries are likely to see a
shift of saving to real assets that will provide long-term real
security.
In addition, the relatively higher real rates across emerging markets
are attractive for investment flows into those countries from western
investors as risk adjusted returns appear more favourable. Developed
market currency weakness amplifies the attraction of emerging market
investment. Flows of capital to emerging markets have a clear impact on
wealth creation – a principal driver of gold demand in emerging
countries.
15
Conclusion
Most central banks currently view their country’s economic state as
unacceptable and have acted to accelerate the economic recovery.
However, there are many obstacles facing developed countries that will
force central banks to continue their unconventional monetary policies.
In the US, the Fed is motivated by the ailing labour and housing markets
and would like unemployment and inflation to be closer to normalised
levels. The market expects partial normalisation to begin around mid to
late 2014, though if Japan were to be used as a guide, a prolonged
period of subpar performance may lie in store. BoJ’s policies have set a
precedent in unconventional monetary policy duration as they are now in
their 12th year. The ECB is caught between regional recession coupled
with fiscal austerity and a prolonged period of intervention before
growth and price stability are restored to a consistent path.
The backdrop of negative real yields, a slow recovery and a likely
continuation of expansionary monetary policies – with all the risks
these present – provides further support to the long-term strategic
investment case for gold.
1Unconventional monetary policy refers to measures used to provide liquidity once policy rates are at the zero bound.
22 Long-term average volatilities (December 1987 to
date): Gold (15.7%), Global equities (15.2%), Emerging markets (18.8%),
Global bonds (5.5%), Commodities (21.4%), US dollar index (8.6%), Q3
volatility: Gold (14.4%), Global equities (12.8%), Emerging markets
(15.6%), Global bonds (3.8%), Commodities (18.1%), US dollar index
(6.7%).
3The US ISM survey has ticked up in September to 51.5, down from a high of 60 in January 2011.
4NBER definition of two consecutive quarters of negative growth.
5Gross debt reached 236% of GDP and the budget deficit 10% of GDP.
6BIS Annual Report 2011/2012, Neely, Christopher J. The large-scale asset purchases had large international effects, 2012.
7BIS Annual Report 2011/2012, White, 2012. The
unintended consequences of loose monetary policy. Economist, QE, or not
QE?, July 2012.
8Berkmen, S. Bank of Japan’s quantitative and credit
easing: Are they now more effective?; Gambacorta et al. The
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy at the zero lower bound:
A cross-country analysis, 2012. Kozicki et al. Unconventional monetary
policy: The international experience with central bank asset purchases,
Bank of Canada review, 2011.
9Under the ‘transaction’ motive of money, nominal GDP equates to demand for money.
10Bundesbank prepared to accept higher inflation, Spiegel online, May 2012.
11Minutes of the (Riksbank) monetary policy meeting, September 2012.
12“Norway won’t tolerate persistent Krone Gains, Qvigstad says”, Bloomberg, August 2012.
13Financial Times, September 2012.
14Reinhart and Reinhart. After the fall, 2010. Jorda et al. When credit bites back: leverage, business cycles, and crises, 2012.
15World Gold Council, India: heart of gold: strategic
outlook. World Gold Council, China gold report: gold in the year of the
tiger.
Investment statistics commentary archive
The quarterly Investment Statistics Commentary succeeded the Gold
Investment Digest (GID), which was published between Q3 2006 and Q2 2011
and examined trends in price, investment markets and the macro-economy
relating to gold and other assets typically found in an investor
portfolio.
The Commentary complements the
investment statistics analysis updated on a regular basis.
Investment statistics commentary Q2 2012
Investment statistics commentary Q1 2012
Full year 2011 - Download this do